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Résumé  : Après une brève description de ce que le fonctionnalisme visait à 
accomplir, je déploie un certain nombre de considérations qui suggèrent que si 
l’on entend faire une place plus importante à l’esprit et notamment une place 
plus importante sur le plan causal, il ne nous est pas d’un grand secours. Un 
bref final traite d’une proposition hyperminimaliste récemment développée par 
Fodor.  
 
 
Starting around 1960, I developed a view in the philosophy 
of mind based on the analogy between a mind and a digital 
computer. I gave my view the name "functionalism," and 
under this name it has become the dominant view — some 
say the orthodoxy —in contemporary philosophy of mind.        
Hilary Putnam1  
 
STRANGER: We proposed as a sufficient mark of real things 
the presence in a thing of the power of being acted upon or 
of acting in relation to however insignificant a thing.  
THEAETETUS: Yes   Plato, The Sophist, 248 c-d 
 
 
As every schoolboy knows, metaphysics is one thing, ontology is 
another, and epistemology is a third one. To conflate the three of them or 
any of them pairwise is a mistake. Or so I was taught. Given the quirky 
character of my education a few more words of terminological 
clarification will not be amiss. Anybody who finds the distinction trivial is 
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strongly invited to skip this paragraph. Ontology has to do with what there 
is in the widest possible sense. There are ontologies comprising only 
particulars, some only concrete particulars, some having both particulars 
and universals. Some will have room for abstract entities outside space and 
time and some will want to stick to the idea that what fundamentally is 
there is temporal and spatial, and so forth. I leave it as an easy exercise to 
identify different views and currents. Each one will set up a specific 
strategy, most often a specific argumentative strategy to show why the 
ontology presented ought to be that one. To use an example as illustration 
almost all nominalistic ontologies will have some special theory 
accounting for numbers or possibilia, since it appears intuitively clear that 
once one claims that concrete particulars in space-time are the basic 
furniture of the universe, numbers are not or, at least, don't look like 
concrete particulars at all. I am not taking sides here, I am just pointing out 
a distinction which will turn out to be useful later on. Metaphysics on the 
other hand I view as a series of doctrines which purport to give us ways of 
identifying, differentiating, etc. what is there. This sounds like too delicate 
a distinction but I think it does make a difference. One may very well have 
an ontology in which both Rolex watches and fake Rolex watches are 
readily available (this is most certainly the case in any point east of the 
Caucasus) and yet have no criteria of identity that will tell which is which 
even in principle. One may then in a case like that have a metaphysics of 
the origin: applied in the case at hand it delivers the doctrine that only 
Rolex watches coming out of the correctly placed Swiss factory are 
Rolexes (note that this is a criterion that may not have anything to do with 
the intrinsic property of the token watch one buys: it may keep time and 
look from any standpoint exactly like the original, it isn't one because it 
does not originate from the right source. Compare and contrast: if one has 
an ontology which does allow unreduced social objects, such as credit 
cards, one is by the same token very much better off having some criterion 
to take care of forgery (again a metaphysics of the origin can do, but a 
metaphysics of social acceptance may work as well for certain purposes at 
least, not as a legal defense, I gather.)  
Epistemology is then, in a boringly traditional fashion, the set of 
theories that deals with how we come to know any of this. Epistemologies 
are then theories of justification in essence. Knowledge is, at least, 
justified true belief and how we come to acquire any justified true belief 
isn't in most cases very clear at all. Note that in lots of cases we do have 
views that collapse one level with another. W.V.O. Quine's great motto "to 
be is to be the value of bound variable" (within something like a first order 
formal theory) is a way of linking strictly the ontology with a metaphysics, 
in his case a metaphysics of nominalistic flavor cum a specific doctrine of 
3 
the metaphysical import of the fact that a theory can be rendered in a 
canonical form.  
Indirectly, one can see the wisdom of the old ways by observing that any 
theory claiming two of those to be at bottom identical is not trivial and 
takes quite a bit of argument to establish. The above mentioned Quine is a 
case in point. Turning to a different period, Peirce held truth to be just 
acceptability under epistemically ideal conditions. To prove his case took 
him a massive amount of work and its results are far from obvious. On the 
face of it, it looks as though a plain reality principle, not to mention 
Popperian scruples, suggests that even our best present theory can be 
wrong and either say something false or entail something false. Ditto for 
the best conceivable theory.  
I won't pass judgment on functionalism's sins immediately. I just remark 
for the nonce that the persuasive power of the doctrine depends on its 
silence about the ontology of the mental2. 
IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO 
The time in which Putnam framed his seminal functionalist approach 
was very much preoccupied with the post-Rylean questions of mind-body 
identity. The driving force of his functionalism comes from an empirical 
consideration in itself very compelling. It appears very likely that I can't be 
the one and only entity with mental states. It seems overwhelmingly likely 
that different creatures are physically vastly diverse. Here philosophers 
have been particularly fond of using far-fetched examples involving 
Martians, Venusians, etc. The intuition's grip seems to me much stronger if 
one considers a simple case. An adult and a baby human have two very 
different brains. Under the assumption that both can feel pain or pleasure, 
what corresponds or realizes the mental states <being-in-pain> and 
                                                 
2 Writes Ned J. Block; "Theories of the mind prior to functionalism have been 
concerned both with what there is and with what gives each type of mental state its 
own identity, for example what pains have in common in virtue of which they are 
pain... [functionalism] answers the metaphysical question without answering the 
ontological question." See Ned J. Block, "Functionalism (2)", in Samuel Guttenplan 
(ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind; Oxford, 1994; pp. 325-326. The line 
I am suggesting here claims that while functionalism makes a metaphysical claim it is 
compatible with any ontology. More precisely: a class of functionally defined states is 
PAIN because of the relations between inputs and outputs of anything which can be 
the realization of a Turing machine, or a finite automaton, etc. Note the "anything" 
there. If angels can glow purple whenever the Virgin's name is taken in vain, there is 
a proper functionally definable state according to which we can attribute 'pain' to the 
angels.  
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<feeling-pleasure> in their respective nervous systems has to be very 
different. Since we do not have any clear a priori reason to be chauvinistic 
about the attribution of mental states ("could a computer be in pain?" 
sounds like an empirical question and not one that can be solved by 
analysis of the concept of pain) we reach the conclusion that mental states 
are multiply realizable. Mental states can be "implemented", jargon has it, 
in all sorts of different natural or artificial minds. The minds in question 
have to possess the properties needed to be interpretable as probabilistic 
automata3. The relation between the mental and the neural/physical is to be 
seen on the model of the relation between hardware and programs in 
computers. The view was a direct response to the identity theorists. If one 
takes the identity view in its simplest way it turns out that it can never be 
the case of both a computer and myself being in pain, given the differences 
of the physical properties that would in the two cases underlie the mental 
state. Indeed the multiple realizability argument is persuasive against the 
identity theory4.  
The plot gets somewhat thicker when a rather different concern is our 
focus. To approximate my point, let us consider the idea that mentation 
consists in, perhaps among other things, having certain mental contents. It 
seems to me that the chief reason we have a mentalistic language or 
conceptual scheme is to interpret our acting. "interpret" here has to be 
carefully handled since it is ambiguous, at least in the present 
philosophical climate.  
One reading has it that our interpretations are ex-post rationalizations. 
Attributing mentality to entities is a matter of stance. As a stance the 
attributing is subject to all the fine differences in degrees one can think 
of. To the extent that one finds it useful one can attribute mental contents 
("I want more light," "More light comes from that direction") to plants. I 
won't discuss directly this way of describing our attributing mental states. 
It is egregiously defended and espoused by Daniel Dennett. I am quite 
persuaded that it is one coherent way of being functionalist. I also happen 
                                                 
3 See Hilary Putnam, "The mental life of some machines" in Hector-Neri Castañeda 
(ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception ; Detroit 1967. 
4 The multiple realizability does have troubles of its own. Ned J. Block famously 
presented a battery of considerations charging functionalist identification of mental 
states with computational/functional states with too much chauvinism and too much 
liberalism. Skipping the metaphors the charges are that functionalism both attributes 
mentality to entities such that the attribution is nearly absurd at the intuitive level (the 
People's Republic of China) and it denies mentation for many systems that just have a 
different psychology. (See Ned J. Block "Troubles with functionalism" in David M. 
Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford-New York, 1991, pp. 211-228.) 
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to believe it encounters different kinds of difficulties and that it is 
probably false. This won't be important here since I am going to assume a 
form of realism about the mental. 
A second and very different reading has it that mentation is not per se a 
matter of interpretation. There is indeed some fact of the matter, whether 
we do get it right or not, as to what has a certain mental state. Furthermore 
the kind of explanation we adopt by attributing mental states to entities is 
in essence causal. It is to me plain that the second interpretation may be 
called realism. Realism about mental states views attributions as subject 
to all possible difficulties of epistemically hard cases, none the less the 
ontology is, so to speak, there. The essential ingredient of realism about 
mentation is the idea that mental contents are causally efficacious. This 
may sound like a distinction without a difference or a form of 
philosophical sophistry. 
The difference here is between theories taking mental states to be 
causally irrelevant and those which don't. Most notably Wittgenstein and 
many of his followers view mental states as a peculiar kind of ex-post 
rationalized explanation of instances of behavior, not as causes of 
behavior in the first place. A lot hangs on the force attributed to the 
'because' in a sentence like "Wittgenstein went to Norway because he liked 
fjords." The realist about mentality takes 'because' to be the marker of a 
causal explanation, the intentional stance supporter takes it to be a result 
of application of charity principles and the like.  
The tension was present already in Wittgenstein's dictum to the effect 
that a reason can never be a cause. We face a reproduction of the dualism 
we were avoiding. The traditional dualism of substances is replaced by a 
dualism of explanatory levels. For those who stick to some form of 
physicalism there appears to be an axiom that can't be given up. Lepore & 
Loewer express it thus: "the physical is causally closed."5. Being closed 
entails that any physical event has a causal genesis composed entirely of 
physical events. Hence the dilemma: if an instance of behavior on the part 
of an entity with a mind is a physical event (something many don't 
dispute), then mental content can't have any causal relevance to it. The 
famous alternative is Davidson's view that the mental contents (call them 
reasons for perspicuity) are causes but not in virtue of their being mental. 
They are causes in virtue of their being physical. One needs to see mental 
contents as both physical and mental. This is the metaphysical kernel of 
Davidson's anomalous monism. The plausibility of anomalous monism 
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seems to me to rest on the shaky rock of the possibility of 
epiphenomenalism as a viable philosophy of mind. 
I think a reasonable desideratum for a realist theory of the mind 
consists in the requirement that minds are causally relevant. Why a 
desideratum? because there is one alternative. One could consistently 
hold the view that mental contents are real and epiphenomenal. A word of 
explanation is not amiss on what epiphenomenalism is. The best and most 
straightforward instance of epiphenomenon I owe to an example by 
Jaegwon Kim. A moving object projects a shadow (under the proper 
conditions of illumination.) The shadow is a phenomenon and it exhibits 
all sorts of interesting regularities. However it does nothing with respect 
to the motion of the object. It does nothing in the sense of being causally 
irrelevant to the motion. One sense of epiphenomenal is the strong one. 
One could have the view that because of unknown correlations that are 
purely accidental every time event A causes event B to take place, event K 
takes place too6. In this very strong form epiphenomenalism could not 
care less about causation and causal links. All we observe is the presence 
of a sort of reliable coincidence, a Humean causation if one wishes to call 
it so. However its very strength is also its weakness if one looks after the 
types of correlation that afford some generalizable, or lawlike, 
expression.  
The weak sense of epiphenomenalism is more of a worry here. Take 
event A to be the Landers earthquake of june 1992. Take event B to be the 
lifting of the ridge near Emerson fault in the Mojave desert. A caused also 
the motion of a large numbers of needles in seismographs across the 
world. Call the movement of the needles K. Now relative to the lifting of 
the ridge K is epiphenomenal in the weak sense. A is the causally relevant 
factor for B and for K. A is a cause of B in virtue of some of its properties 
and not of all of them. It is a (causal) property of A to be able to move the 
needles of seismographs. It is in turn the moving of needles that can get 
semantically valued, say (being a symbol of) "being an earthquake of 
degree 9." Now, relative to the lifting of the ridge, the semantic property, 
or the content of K, is epiphenomenal in the weak sense. There is a long 
causal and semantical story that can be told with measurements thrown in. 
However the content of K, the semantic content of K is something 
hovering over A and B. This very property is causally inert in lifting the 
ridge in the desert.  
                                                 
6 I have in mind the logical possibility that each time I light a cigar in Hong-Kong a 
rock moves on the Moon. Why this would happen is perfectly unclear and it is not at 
all clear that anybody would have any interest in looking at it.  
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Epiphenomenalism in the weak sense seems to be the proper view for 
mental states as well if one accepts the functionalist-computational view. 
Mental states as functional states are purely abstract. If the physical is 
causally closed it has to be the concrete implementation of mental states 
that is causally active. I submit that a functionalist view is committed to 
weak epiphenomenalism.  
To see why suppose the belief that grass-is-green is realized by my 
present neural configuration, with all the appropriate functional inputs and 
outputs. If such a belief is causally relevant in my actively seeking to buy 
green shirts because I like the grass' color it can be such in virtue of a set 
of connections between neural states. <that-grass-is-green> plays no role 
in my going out to buy the green stuff since, by the prior definition of 
mental state and by the closure of the physical, an abstract state would not 
interact with my neural states.  
A LUCKY HARMONY 
Epiphenomenalism spells trouble only for the realist. The 
instrumentalist view can quite well live with a form of epiphenomenalism. 
As long as there is some reasonable degree of parallelism between 
attribution of states and the behavior of the system states are attributed to, 
the instrumentalist should not be bothered. The realist about minds on the 
other hand may be bothered by the futility of the mental. After all, short of 
a pre-established harmony, that my belief is about green grass has no 
causal relevance whatsoever. The computational state realized by the 
automaton I am does all the causal work relative to behavior: its content or 
its semantical property is otiose7.  
One alternative notoriously exploited by Jerry Fodor is to see mental 
contents as dual entities with a narrow and a wide component. Narrow 
                                                 
7 Reaching it from a different route, John Heil makes a similar point in "Minds and 
Bodies."; in Warner R., & Szubka T., The Mind-Body Problem; Oxford 1994; 
pp. 156-164. Heil uses two ways to approach epiphenomenalism. One is supported by 
externalist theories of reference. If externalism is correct then the contents of a 
mental state referring to grass depend on its relational properties. Heil notes: "the 
causal powers of an object depend exclusively on that object nonrelational, here-and-
now characteristics." (p. 158). Therefore mental contents are causally irrelevant. The 
second possibility is that contents are genetically built. The analogy Heil uses is chess 
pieces. Being a rook for a piece of wood depends on having played a role in chess 
games. Being a piece of the Chinese Great Wall is causally otiose with regards to a 
brick that breaks my glass. The causal powers of the brick depend on weight, shape, 
etc., and not at all on it historical origin. If contents are genetically properties of neural 
states in this sense, again mental contents are epiphenomenal relative to behavior.  
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contents are essentially individualistic, internalistic entities supervening 
on nonintentional monadic properties of the body (the brain most likely.) 
They are individualistic because they play the role of pushing individual 
behaviors. Their principles of individuation are not sensible to the 
distinction one may have externalistically. Narrowly conceived the desire 
<I want to drink water> would be not distinct between the two possible 
contents, as in the twin thought experiment cases in which I and my 
counterpart face environments differing with regards to the chemical 
composition of the liquid we both call "water" and which is phenomally not 
distinguished by our perceptual states. Narrow contents are internalistic 
since to adopt the usual line one could very well have the same narrow 
content individuated by "I see water in the glass" in the case in which the 
glass is full of water and in the case of the glass full of vodka. If this 
narrow content is what pushes behavior one will quickly be painfully aware 
or pleasantly surprised by the sharp distinction between narrow contents 
driving one's actions and the wide contents having to do with how the 
environment is hospitable to one's own narrowly conceived mental states8. 
This solution seems to, for the nonce at any rate, unstable.  
                                                 
8 Narrow contents are essentially individualistic, supervening on nonintentional and 
monadic properties of the body. They should be relevant to psychological explanation. 
Roughly they are a cognitive counterpart of Kaplan and Perry's characters. The story 
gets very quickly complicated here. For one thing the whole narrow vs. wide content 
machinery has had a hard time facing the assault by the externalist views, most 
notably of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Jerry Fodor himself in more recent times 
tends to see Burge's point as stronger and indeed compatible with an intentional 
psychology. I presented some problems for narrow contents in "Hopes and Doubts" in 
European Review of Philosophy ; vol. 1; CSLI Publications, Stanford, Calif., 1994. 
Those have been expanded upon by Elisabeth Pacherie in Naturaliser 
l'intentionnalité; Paris 1993, ch. VIII. Pacherie holds that narrow content isn't 
content anymore. Block in "What Narrow Content is Not" (See Barry Loewer and 
Georges Rey, eds.; Meaning In Mind: Fodor and his Critics; Oxford 1991) shows 
how on one construal narrow content collapses into syntax and on another plausible 
construal is purely holistic. I won't enter into the debate there. For one thing the 
discussion on narrow contents seem to be quicksand. For another Fodor is quite aware 
of his holding a sort of dual explanation: "... it is very important to keep clear on the 
difference between the following two questions. "What's the story about the properties 
of mental states in virtue of which they are subsumed by psychological laws?" and 
"What's the story about the properties of mental states in virtue of which they are 
engaged by mental processes?" If the computational theory of the mind is true, then 
the properties of mental states in virtue of which they are engaged in mental 
processes are intrinsic/syntactic. If informational theories of content are right, then the 
properties of mental states in virtue of which they are subsumed by psychological laws 
are extrinsic/relational." see Jerry Fodor, in Meaning in Mind, op. cit. p. 298. 
9 
The realist about the mental if wedded to a functional-computational 
view of mental states is stuck with what Block calls the 'Paradox of the 
Causal Efficacy of Content'. The paradox comes from being committed to 
three claims. Each one of them appears to be true, and yet they are jointly 
unsatisfiable:  
1. The intentional content of a thought is causally relevant to its 
behavioral effects. 
2. Intentional content reduces to meanings of internal representations. 
3. Internal processors are sensitive only to the syntax of internal 
representations9  
Syntax here has to be taken as tokens which are completely devoid of 
any meaning. Even if we were to find something like the shape <0>, 
perhaps by neurons that neatly sit in a circle, that would not mean zero. 
The processor that computes conjunctions will only be able to spit out a 0 
if and only if it receives two 0's as input. It couldn't care less if 0 means 
zero, or one or anything else. Semantics, no matter which view one will 
prefer, will have to deal with something relational in ways in which syntax 
never will.  
Too many laws and too many properties 
One of the remedies called in to defuse the apparent fishiness of this 
form of parallelism has been the appeal to laws. Since I have nothing new 
to add to points that have been made elsewhere I simply rely on the 
conclusion drawn by Block10. Many different laws have been called into 
service. The solution turns out to leave the epiphenomenalism intact.  
When I first presented some of the reasons to be suspicious of 
functionalism11, it was objected to me that dealing with causal claims we 
                                                 
9 Ned J. Block, "Can the Mind Change the World?"; in MacDonald C. & MacDonald 
G. (eds.) Philosophy of Psychology; Oxford, 1995; p. 30. 
10 In "Can the Mind Change the World?", op. cit.; pp. 37-39. I voice just a mild 
skepticism about the strength of our grasp of what is involved in the distinction 
between ceteris paribus and strict laws. Philosophers of science, most notably Nancy 
Cartwright, suggest that all laws may in some sense need contextual parameters to be 
fixed. Philosophers of language, most notably Stephen Schiffer, deny to nonstrict laws 
even the status of laws.  
11 At the 1994 meeting of the Italian Society of Analytical Philosophy. Thanks are 
hereby extended to all of those who took the pain to listen and answer. In scattered 
order Roberto Casati, Roberta De Monticelli, Mauro Dorato, Simone Gozzano, 
Francesco Orilia. The second incarnation of this piece has been read to all members, 
students and faculty, of the institute of philosophy at my university. To all of them my 
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always have the theoretical option to take properties to be causally 
relevant. The idea has its merits12. Let us explore then the possibility that 
in the case of mental causation of behavior it is properties of states that 
are causally relevant. If a mental state is individuated functionally one may 
think of its properties as both mental and physical. Now which properties 
are causally relevant in the sense a realist would want them to be? As long 
as one accepts Block's premise 3 and the "closure" of the physical it would 
appear that the physical/syntactic properties of the mental state are doing 
all the causal work. One of the reasons many nowadays greet substance 
dualism with an incredulous stare is its interactionist mystery. It is never 
clear how a substance within space-time would be causally related to one 
without space-time. The duality of properties does rebut the incredulous 
stare by firmly placing mental and physical properties very much within 
the same framework. What it does not do is to assuage the qualms of the 
mental realist (in the sense sketched above.) For if the syntactic 
properties are doing all the causal work (in terms of causing behavior) the 
mere fact that there are mental properties that got attached to them is not 
enough to show that the mental (or intentional properties) are 
efficacious13. It has to be assumed that syntactic properties can have a 
                                                 
 
thanks too. A special word for Elisabeth Pacherie: though an exceptionally good 
researcher herself she played the role of schoolgirl making me realize how many times 
I am too quick, too allusive, assuming too much, and at the end of the day not clear 
enough for all schoolboys and schoolgirls. To her cruel sense of clarity and insight the 
shape of this paper owes much. To her wonderfully non cruel person I owe much that 
would not be easy to spell out. The paper is dedicated to her, humbly asking for 
patience when I am not up to her standards.  
12 I am not sure there is a clear sense in which a property in and by itself is causally 
efficacious. It would seem to me it is the instantiation of a property which is efficient. 
The point may be more notational than substantial though. In the paper nothing 
depends on what "carriers" of causality one's ontology will select at the end of the 
day. 
13 The problem here seems to be left unsolved even by those who have a direct 
explanation of intentionality. John Searle thinks there is an intrinsic intentionality of the 
brain which has a sort of "dual aspect." See, e.g. the following passage: "My present 
state of consciousness with all its subjectivity, intentionality, causal powers, 
phenomenology, 'qualia', and the rest of it, is just a feature or set of features of my 
brain. And it is caused by the behavior of lower level elements of my brain in the 
same unmysterious sense of 'cause' that the solidity of this table with all its features is 
caused by the behavior at the lower level of molecules and at the same time the 
solidity is just a higher level feature or set of features of the entire system that is 
composed of those molecules." (see John R. Searle, in John Searle and His Critics; 
Oxford, 1991; p. 141.) Ned Block notes that Dretske has a similar problem vis-a-vis 
epiphenomenalism. It appears to me that all biological explanations of the fixation of 
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causal role via their computational implementations, i.e. via the brain 
states and processes materializing them. An open avenue can be to claim 
that while syntactic properties are the causally relevant ones (with regards 
to the brain that realizes them) the properties responsible for mental 
content are second-order properties defined over first-order ones. 
Arguably mental states as semantically valuable states can be seen as 
second order properties. To use a medical example: being anaesthetic is a 
second order property many different substances possess. Penthotal is 
anaesthetic in virtue of the (chemical) properties of thiopental sodium. 
Curare works as or is anaesthetic via the properties of alkaloids. Though 
my chemistry does not go beyond high-school level one could decide that 
the proper level of causal explanation is chemical14. Alkaloids as well as 
sodium have causal efficacy with regards to my being anaesthetized. The 
properties may in fact be rather different (in this case they just are: the 
kind of effects are different although both anaesthetic.)  
Now, if this can be taken as a model for functionally conceived mental 
states, it seems to me that the realist about mental states would view 
functionalism as fouled by weak epiphenomenalism. The connection 
between the property, chemical or physical more generally, that seems to 
do all the causal work and the second order property (which ought to 
coincide with the mental state as a contentful state) can be as nomological 
as one likes. In fact one can describe a variety of laws in one sense or 
another that permit us to group together all anaesthetic substances as well 
as all states that can be the belief that grass grows. All those laws will be 
instances in which we have nomic correlations. Unless we are able to 
show that second order properties are causally efficacious the 
correlations themselves will be exactly what weak epiphenomenalism is 
describing15.  
                                                 
 
intentionality face a similar challenge. The issue though would have to be explored in 
detail. 
14 I am less impressed than Block by the worry that there may not be a fundamental 
level of everything. At each level of explanation one can decide what the right causal 
structure should be. For brains that could very well be chemical, unless there are more 
serious reasons than what we have so far to call up quantum-theoretical phenomena.  
15 Block in "Can the Mind Change the World?", op. cit.) presents a very limited case 
for the possibility of envisaging a sort of generalized placebo effect. Being told that 
substance alpha has the power to put me to sleep, I go to sleep if given substance 
alpha which has none of the first-order properties directly connected with sleep. I am 
not sure at all that we could generalize such a phenomenon to the causal efficacy of 
mental states. One of the reasons is mentioned by Block himself: it takes an intelligent 
being to be affected by placebo effects (no placebo for plans, or so it seems. The 
12 
Summary, Coda, and some very provisional conclusions  
It seems to me that the orthodoxy of functionalism, as perhaps many 
orthodoxies, solves many problems and opens up a bunch of new ones, or 
reopens old ones. In the scorecard for what was really answered is the 
issue that multiple realizability brings about for any type-type identity 
theory for mental states. At the same time it makes an excellent use of the 
best technology available to model at least some of the mental functions. I 
see this as a real advantage. 
What is a bit stickier is the sort of worry philosophers may have. In the 
philosophy of mind the desiderata are debatable. All I said here depends 
on the crucial assumption that mental contents have to be causally 
efficacious and not just relevant in explanatory terms. Mental contents can 
be explanatory at some level or other and remain epiphenomenal at the 
causally explanatory level. This I take to be a view that entails their 
fundamental uselessness in terms of the influence the mental has on our 
actions and all forms of behavior. This is a debatable point since I am 
excluding possibilities that are perfectly coherent (and at time they seem 
even more plausible given the very strangeness of the mind-body 
problem.) For instance the very possibility that mind are syntactic engines 
and semantic aspects are purely illusory. It would take another series of 
papers to see why it would be desirable to have real semantics, 'real' in the 
Platonic sense foreshadowed in the second quotation on top of this paper.  
For the nonce all I want to point out is the following: functionalist 
readings of mental states are the logical ancestors of epiphenomenalism. 
Functionalism breeds epiphenomenalism on the assumption that there is 
no causal trade between the purely abstract and the very mundane 
implementation levels.  
Detours via even more complex notions of laws and property theories 
seem to bring about more problems rather than less suspicious looking 
results. The argument for all of this is, in its skeleton form, trivial. The 
abstract realm of functional characterizations is not per se causally 
efficacious. Whatever is mental in a mental state seems to have something 
to do with the semantics of its contents. Those are, at least, not fully 
                                                 
 
second one is that if something akin to placebo effects is the right model of neural 
communication we would have a completely absurd picture of the brain. If so the 
entire computational model has to be dragged back to its Turingian origins.  
On these points, on quantum mechanics, and many others, thanks are hereby 
expressed to A.L.F. for unstintingly disposing of her time to listen to my nightly 
rantings.  
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captured by the functional characterizations (be that because of 
externalism in the philosophy of language, or the specific theory of 
reference one adopts, or because of Putnam's worries about the 
ineliminably normative nature of meanings, etc.) What seems to be doing 
all the causal work is the concrete implementation of the mental state, the 
neural, or neural together with even more physical stuff, state underlying 
it. Hence it looks as though the mental qua mental is idle. Hence 
epiphenomenalism. 
Is epiphenomenalism really bad? That depends on the kind of theory of 
mind one prefers. For my part as a sort of penultimate barricade I would 
tend to shy away from epiphenomenalism insofar as possible.  
Nearly anything should be tried before giving in. "everything" including 
perhaps abandoning the ontological neutrality of the functional 
characterization of mental states.  
The wages of the "sin" of not making any commitment in terms of the 
ontology of mental states are then paid with the currency of 
epiphenomenalism.  
As for the redemption: a moderate dose of reimmersion in 
physiofunctionalism in the short run will certainly do in lieu of penance.  
The suggestion may seem retrograde and backwards, and I won't even 
try to defend it.  
I state it in every simple terms: what has to give is the idea that 
ontological neutrality is the best way. We may be forced to restart looking 
at local forms of reductions that would entail that nothing is common 
between my pains and my pleasures, my thoughts and their contents 
thereof and those of my Martian cousins. Local reductions in this sense 
would be species-specific and the multiple realizability would go by the 
board.  
This it too quick and I am sure I bored any reader more than required.  
Recondita armonia: Coda (only for those not bored enough) 
 
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a heav'n of hell, a hell of heav'n. 
John Milton, Paradise Lost, Bk I, 254-255 
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Jerry Fodor in his Jean Nicod Lectures16 faced the difficulties and 
presented a line of reasoning he summarizes as follows: ... I'm not going 
to argue that psychological laws should be broadly construed, and I'm not 
going to argue against narrow content. A fortiori, I'm not going to argue 
that the notion of narrow content is incoherent or otherwise infirm. What I 
am going to argue is this: the considerations that have been supposed to 
show that an externalist construal of content won't meet the purposes of 
psychological explanation are, on balance, unconvincing. So maybe narrow 
content is superfluous." [Fodor 1994, 28] 
The strategy Fodor adopts is to defuse the impact of what have been 
taken to be the main reasons in favor of the adoption of some sort of dual 
account of mental content (narrow/wide, external/internal, etc.)  The 
troublemaking cases are neatly placed in the categories of Twins, Experts, 
and Fregean. The Twins and the Experts are cases alleged to present 
unsurmountable difficulties for internalism, the Fregean cases are all the 
clones of the Morning Star which is the Evening Star and, all the same, the 
Babylonian rational agent kept thinking that 'The Morning Star is bright' is 
not a notational variant of 'The Evening Star is bright', due to lack of 
astronomical sophistication or something like that.  
I myself find the Twin cases unconvincing at the end of the day and not 
only for Fodor's reasons. Twin cases are thought experiments in which 
Twin environments or Twin agents are placed but one, usually rather small 
element is changed. One could conceive of some possible world in which 
everything is like here, but water is not composed by the same chemical 
elements, even remaining the main way of quenching one's thirst. They 
work as intuition pumps and I don't find much force at all in the intuitions 
that are constantly put to use17.  Much is there to appreciate in Fodor's 
treatment of the Expert cases. These are deferential uses of concepts. 
There are demonstrably many cases in which using a concept we defer to 
                                                 
16 Now published in The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, Mass: MIT press 1994. 
Numbers in square brackets [Fodor 1994, #] are all from the published text. 
17 Similar doubts on the intelligibility of thought experiments carried out in the 
philosophy of mind have been expressed by Kathleen V. Wilkes in her Real People, 
Oxford 1988 (see in particular Ch. 1 and 2.) The gist of her points is that quite simply 
we have a very slippery grasp, if any at all, of what is possible under the purported 
environmental conditions described by the fictional setting. To use one example: it may 
very well be possible, or so it seems to me at least under several notions of possibility, 
that nothing at all can have the same phenomenal properties as water and at the same 
time fail to be H2O. Unless of course one starts varying more and more of the 
background involved, getting a weaker and weaker grip on the content of our 
"linguistic" intuitions.  
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an expert opinion on its extension, or even on the precise linguistic usage. 
Many of us don't really know much about glasses spin except that it is an 
interesting subject very much studied in Denmark and in Rome (this is the 
extent of my precise understanding of it, for instance.) We defer to 
experts to get the right extension conditions. Fodor has the excellent idea 
of seeing this as a case of exploitation, rather than as a case of linguistic 
division of labor. We exploit experts much as we could exploit 
mechanical arms in a radioactive environment. The Experts are more 
pervasive than one can think: even fairly everyday concept such as chair or 
sofa need an expert to defer to [see Fodor 1994, 36]: the hiring of an 
interior decorator to get one's sofa properly color coordinated is akin to 
asking what 'sofa' means to the decorator, the expert in the right 
conceptual field.  
The Fregean cases are a bit more difficult and I would venture to say 
that even Fodor leaves much to be desired in his treatment. The key idea 
exploited in The Elm and the Expert is that while psychological laws are 
laws, they are such only with the everything else being equal qualifier. 
The move is to claim that Fregean cases (Oedipus who wants to marry 
Jocasta-qua-"Jocasta" and does not want to marry Jocasta-qua-"my 
mother", and all the related affairs in which poor Jocasta is his mother 
after all) are indeed empirically given as exceptions. If they proliferate 
psychology as a system of intentional laws is impossible: "... ceteris 
paribus laws tolerate exceptions, so long as the exceptions are 
unsystematic." [Fodor 1994, 39] 
Fregean cases aren't systematic, but unlike water-as-H2O and water-as-
XZ in parallel universes, they do happen a lot [Fodor 1994, 49]. And this 
alone should give us pause. To hang the theory on an empirical claim about 
the frequency of Fregean cases is risky indeed and maybe not necessary. 
 Now I don't think I am able to consider all the possible variations 
Fodor looks upon, the main one being his refutation of Quine 
unscrutability of reference. 
I prefer to finish with a remark more directly connected with the main 
body of what interests me here, namely that one line of thought in 
philosophy engenders epiphenomenalism. I remain ultimately neutral, and 
not penultimately though, on whether epiphenomenalism itself should be 
embraced as a welcome consequence or whether we should struggle when 
dead from the waist down to see it explained out. 
The solution presented by Fodor is to the effect that the narrowness of 
content (if any) is captured by the semantics of the piece of mentalese 
sentence that encodes a proposition. These sentences are indeed as 
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finegrained as needed to be descriptive of all modes of presentation we 
can come up with. It looks as though it is the computational role that does 
all the explanatory work (in terms of explanations of behavior.) Again 
narrow content is shown to be, though quite possibly not non existent, 
superfluous. Fodor claims this to be the line of thought pursued by Stich 
[Fodor 1994, 50-51] and defends his contention via a renewed form of 
harmony. " One can, I think, imagine a world where everything is delicately 
balanced in the following way: Content is broad, the metaphysics of 
content is externalist (e.g. causal/informational), and modes of 
presentation are sentences of Mentalese. Modes of presentation with 
similar causal histories (or nomic affiliations; anyhow with similar broad 
contents) overlap enough in their syntax to sustain robust psychological 
generalizations. But not enough to make the minds that these 
generalizations subsume homogeneous under syntactic description." 
[Fodor 1994, 52-53] 
The picture painted is Leibnizian and the delicate balance depends on 
the following contingent fact (or hoped for fact): the causal, historical 
path of production of broad contents is such that its mentalese encodings 
are sufficiently similar to warrant our subsuming intentional explanations 
that are robust. Fodor notes that "maybe our world is like that, whether it 
is, is strictly an empirical issue." [Fodor 1994, 53] 
While I think it is perfectly correct to see this as an empirical issue, I 
find no reason to believe that differently assembled lines of broad 
contents, even when they churn out the same product contentwise, should 
have produced modes of presentation similar in the required sense.  
Or perhaps I just see much less harmony in this world, and that's where 
I am.  
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